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Executive summary 
 
 
This report summarises the findings of research into the use of financial payments on 
planning for new housing.  The study was commissioned to help inform the government’s 
approach to piloting Development Benefits (DB).  The research focuses particularly on 
whether direct financial payments to individuals who are likely to oppose house building 
might reduce local opposition to housing development. 
 
The research employed a case study approach and made use of qualitative methods.  
Structured interviews were undertaken with 109 households who would be likely to oppose 
development across six local authority areas in England.  Although this work does not 
constitute a representative survey of the population, the respondents provide a substantive 
evidence base of the views of households in opposition to new housebuilding across a 
range of local authorities. The numbers of interviews achieved have provided significant 
depth and spread of views of different types of households across a range of different 
contexts.  Complementary interviews were undertaken with 3-5 ‘key professionals’ (local 
authority officers, elected members, developers and other stakeholders) in each of the six 
case study areas (n=22) to help contextualize the household interviews and provide 
evidence on the likely impact on the planning system.  In total the research involved 131 
in-depth interviews conducted over a six week period between October and November 
2014. 
 
The key questions addressed by the research were: 
 
 Would a direct financial payment reduce levels of opposition to new housebuilding 
amongst those who are likely to oppose it? 
 
 How much would that payment need to be to influence attitudes and behaviour? 
 
 What are the potential wider implications of financial payments for local planning 
policy? 
 
This approach has produced attitudinal evidence about: 
 
 the potential response to financial payments amongst those who are likely to oppose 
development in a range of local contexts; 
 
 the extent to which direct payments to individuals might influence the scale and scope 
of opposition to new housing development; 
 
 the motivations of those who oppose new housebuilding, including the relationship 
between financial payments and other interventions that might help to reduce levels of 
opposition; 
 
 the potential impact of financial payments on attitudes and behaviours amongst a 
sample of key professionals in the delivery of local planning for housing; and  
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 the potential practical implications of the use of financial payments 
 
 
Key findings 
 
It is important to recognise that the study was a theoretical exercise.  As in any Stated 
Preference study, responses are influenced by the specific wording of the questions and 
the contextual information provided.  A real scenario that involved actual payment may 
have led to different responses.   These caveats need to be taken into account when 
generalising from the findings.    
 
The key findings from household interviews (n=109) are: 
 
 A limited proportion of those interviewed (10%) felt that a direct financial payment 
would or might reduce their opposition to housing development; 6% said it would, 4% 
said maybe. The large majority (84%) felt that the payment would not influence their 
views on housing development or their likelihood to engage in some form of direct or 
indirect opposition to it.   
 
 Those whose attitudes or behaviour might be influenced by a direct payment tended to 
be at the weaker end of the opposition spectrum.   
 
 There was strong principled resistance to the idea of a financial payment amongst 
many households.  Financial payments were associated with ‘bribes’ by 46% of 
respondents.  There were also concerns by households that such payments could lead 
to a reduced developer contribution, especially as pressure on infrastructure and 
services was often the main reason for opposition to housing development.  
 
 Views on opposition to new housebuilding were mainly about the scale of development 
and its impact on local infrastructure and services.  Over one third of respondents said 
that they might be less opposed to new development if they could have more of a say 
over development, or if there was extra resource for infrastructure and services 
(especially schools and health care).     
 
 There were mixed views on the perceived ability of residents to influence development.  
74% of those interviewed felt that individual residents had a limited ability to influence 
development.   
 
 Households generally found it easy to grasp the principles of the use of direct financial 
payments aimed at reducing opposition to new homes. 
 
The findings from key professional interviews (n=22) are: 
 
 There was no significant support for direct financial payments from any of the key 
professionals interviewed. At best, it was felt that such payments would have a 
marginal impact, perhaps easing the progress of some proposals a little in some cases.  
 
 It was felt that potential benefits of financial payments would be outweighed by the 
other, negative, effects.  The main concern was that payments might undermine trust in 
local planning processes.  There was a feeling that payments could be divisive and 
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weaken community cohesion.  There were particular concerns that payments could 
undermine work undertaken by Local Planning Authorities to build consensus and 
certainty around planning for new housebuilding. 
 
 Local authority officers and members emphasized that opposition was an important 
part of the planning system and that it could be handled effectively through existing 
frameworks.  They also felt that the National Planning Policy Framework has made it 
more difficult for planning applications to be prevented or slowed down by opposition 
within local authorities or amongst local residents when they are in conformity with local 
and national planning policy.    
 
 Overall, household views were very consistent with those of the key professionals. The 
main differences are that households were more critical of financial payments from an 
ethical perspective and less likely to identify unintended wider consequences. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
1. At Budget 2014 Government announced that it would “launch a government-funded 
staged pilot for passing a share of the benefits of development directly to individual 
households, including further research and evaluation of the approach” (HM Treasury, 
2014, P.63).  
 
2. The aim of such ‘Development Benefits’ is to reduce the extent to which housing 
development is blocked or delayed as a result of opposition by local residents. The 
expectation is that Development Benefits would do this by providing a new financial 
incentive that would reduce the net incentive for residents to oppose development (i.e. 
eligible households within a certain distance from a new development would receive a 
financial payment when that development goes ahead.) 
 
3. In order to help inform the approach to the piloting of Development Benefits the 
Department for Communities and Local Government commissioned research to 
explore household and professional attitudes towards the use of direct financial 
payments aimed at reducing opposition to new homes.  This report summarises the 
findings of this research study.  
 
4. The aim of the study was to deliver: 
 
 Qualitative research with a range of different types of households who are likely to 
oppose house building in six case studies across England with respect to direct 
payment and the extent to which it might impact on attitudes and behaviours 
towards housing development;  
 
 In-depth qualitative research into key professionals’ (planning officers, developers, 
opposition groups) perceptions of the impact of Development Benefits on the 
planning system. 
 
The main objectives of the research were to provide evidence on:   
 
I. The key underlying reasons for why households oppose housing development; 
 
II. The extent to which direct financial payments might influence attitudes towards 
new development; and 
 
III. The impact of the scale of such payments on attitudes and behaviour. 
 
Structure of the report 
 
5. The second section outlines the research design and presents a summary of the 
research methods used. The second section summarises the evidence review 
summary.  The third and fourth sections present data and findings from the 
household interviews and key professional interviews. Brief conclusions are then 
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provided.  The annexes include the extended evidence review, further data tables 
and the household interview topic guide. 
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2. Research approach and methods 
 
 
There were three elements to the research: 
 
i. A review of evidence and experience relevant to financial payments and new 
housing development; 
ii. Detailed structured interviews with 109 households who ‘were likely to oppose 
new housing development’ across 6 case-study areas selected to represent a 
range of local market conditions and institutional, social, economic and 
development contexts.  The interviews included mostly closed questions that 
could allow for numerical analysis of the spread of responses to a particular 
issue;  
iii. In depth interviews with 3-5 key professionals (i.e. local authority representatives 
and other local stakeholders) in each case-study area in order to contextualise 
the findings from the household interviews and canvass views on the principle 
and practical application of policy.  In total, 22 key professionals were 
interviewed; 
 
6. The field work with households and professionals was carried out during October 
and early November 2014. 
 
7. The research specifically and deliberately focused on households who would or 
would be likely to oppose housing development since they would be the target 
audience for any such government policy.  .  This therefore means that findings are 
not necessarily representative of the general population. This should be borne in 
mind when considering the findings of the household interviews, which only reflect 
the views of households with such attitudes towards new housing development 
 
Case-study selection and context 
 
8. The study focused on six case-study areas drawn from across England.  These were 
either entire local authority areas or parts of such areas. 
 
9. The case-studies reflect a range of geographical, housing market, political-institutional, 
economic and planning contexts. Case study selection drew on data on housing 
delivery and planning context gathered for a previous DCLG study1.   
 
10. The case-study authorities are anonymised throughout the report and are referred 
to by the following geographical categories: inner London (IL), outer London/London 
commuting (LC), the South East (SE), South West (SW), Eastern (E) and North of 
England (N).  In all 6 case studies there is considerable market pressure for new 
                                            
 
1 Dunning, R., Inch, A., Payne, S., Watkins, C., While, A., Young, G., Hickman, H., Bramley, G., McIntosh, 
S., Watkins, D. and Valler, D. (2014) The Impact of the New Homes Bonus on Attitudes and Behaviour, 
unpublished report for DCLG. Planning context data was based on applications, approvals, decision times 
and potential housing capacity. 
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housing development in at least part of the locality.  The SE and N case-studies 
were the Neighbourhood Planning areas.  Table 2.1 provides further general details 
about the case study areas. 
 
 
Table 2.1: Case study profiles 
Case study Urban/rural Planning stance and context 
Inner London 
(IL) 
Urban Area of high demand for new housing. Local authority 
supports increased housebuilding targets in line with 
local plan policy. There are concerns about shortfalls in 
affordable housing, development viability challenges and 
GLA decisions. 
Outer London/ 
London 
commuting (LC) 
Small towns In the face of considerable opposition, the local authority 
has pursued a strategy of managing growth since the 
late 2000s. There have been significant levels of 
housing development over recent decades on the edges 
of the town and further large housing development is 
proposed. The local community continues to oppose 
development but key professionals considered this 
opposition largely ineffective given local plan policy. 
South East (SE) Small town 
in mainly 
urban 
authority 
Neighbourhood Planning area in area of economic 
growth and high demand for new housing. The local 
authority is generally supportive of new housebuilding 
but faced significant opposition in certain parts of the 
local authority area. Significant housing development is 
planned relative to the size of the town.      
South West 
(SW) 
Rural High market demand. Local authority generally opposed 
to the scale of development arising out of latest 
population projections. Lack of five-year land supply and 
the absence of an adopted housing figure means that 
applications are coming forward in many parts of the 
authority. 
Eastern (E) Rural in 
growth area 
High market demand. Support for housing growth by the 
local authority with a clear evidence base and a number 
of large development allocations. Opposition strong 
amongst some communities facing substantial housing 
development. 
Northern (N) Urban fringe This Neighbourhood Planning area has the highest 
housing demand and prices in the city. The Local 
Planning Authority has avoided allocating controversial 
sites in this area, reflecting strong and effective local 
opposition. The identification of a 5-10 year supply of 
housing land is consequently challenging. 
 
 
11. In all cases there was evidence of opposition to new housebuilding either during the 
process of plan preparation, or in response to planning applications.  IL and LC 
have already had significant housing development over the last decade and further 
development is proposed.  In SW, SE and E large new housing developments are 
underway with further development proposed.  In N there is increasing pressure for 
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housing development, particularly in the Neighbourhood Planning area examined 
here. 
 
12. The findings are reported in section 4 as percentages, however sample sizes are 
releatively small and the research is qualitative in nature. Therefore, please refer 
back to the actual number of interviews when considering small percentages. 
 
 
Household interviews 
 
13. Reflecting the aims of the direct financial benefits and the target population – i.e. 
helping to reduce opposition and build support for housebuilding – the interviews 
focused on households who were ‘likely to oppose new housebuilding’.  Household 
interviewees were recruited through a combination of telephone contacts and door-to-
door approaches.  Commercially available telephone contact details were used to 
generate a random sample of telephone numbers in each of the study areas.  
Screening questions were used to identify households “likely to oppose new 
housebuilding”.  Around 10%-30% of those who were contacted by telephone said that 
they were likely to oppose housing development, but the majority of those did not want 
to be interviewed for the study.  To a certain degree, this self selecting sample may 
have skewed the findings. 
 
14. Census Output Areas (OAs) were used to identify and recruit household participants in 
case-studies apart from IL where postcodes were used.  Target OAs and postcodes 
were selected in consultation with local authorities and through a review of allocated 
sites for new housebuilding in local plans.  Target OAs and postcodes were intended to 
provide a diverse sample frame in terms of age, tenure and economic profile of 
households. 
 
15. In general, initial telephone contact was much more effective than door-to-door 
techniques in recruiting households for face to face interviews.  Data collected on 
responses to initial screening in telephone interviews suggests that around a third of 
those sampled through random contact would be likely to oppose new housebuilding.   
 
16. The initial intention was to carry out face to face interviews with all households.  
However given challenges in achieving such interviews in the time allocated a decision 
was made to undertake a combination of telephone and face to face interviews.  
Overall, the household analysis draws on 68 telephone interviews and 41 face-to-face 
interviews (see Table 2.2).  The target was for a minimum of 15 interviews in each 
case-study area.   
 
 
Table 2.2: Number of household interviews 
 
E N IL SE LC SW Total % 
Face to face 6 7 4 8 8 8 41 38% 
Telephone 17 8 13 8 11 11 68 62% 
Total 23 15 17 16 19 19 109 
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17. Further detail on the breakdown of household interviewees by income, house type, 
age and tenure is available in Annex B.  In general there was a reasonable spread 
of responses in terms of age and income bearing in mind that those most likely to 
oppose housing development are likely to be wealthier owner-occupiers.  28% of 
household interviewees were below 50 years of age (72% were aged 50 plus) and 
only 26% of household interviewees had a household income above £50,000.  The 
majority (68%) of those interviewed were in detached or semi-detached houses; 
only 14% were in flats. 
 
18. It was extremely difficult to recruit households from the private rented sector.  
Overall around 10-15% of telephone contacts were to private rented addresses 
(higher for London, lower for the other areas) but those households were less likely 
to oppose development and/or much more reluctant to be interviewed.  As a result 
there was only one interview in the private rented sector.  13% of households 
interviewed were in housing association/local authority rental housing. 
 
Telephone and face-to-face interviews 
19. There was no discernible difference in the quality of telephone and face-to-face 
interviews, mainly because the length and depth of interviews depended more on 
the interviewee’s level of knowledge about, and engagement with, the planning 
system than on the interview medium.  Interviews lasted on average between thirty 
minutes and one hour.  All interviews were audio recorded and detailed notes were 
made of each individual interview, including verbatim quotes that are used in the 
analysis.   
 
Household interview topic guide 
20. Questions related to financial payments were embedded within a broader 
discussion about attitudes and behaviour in relation to new housebuilding.  The 
interviewer started by asking ‘Do you like living in this area?  What is particularly 
good about living here?  What might be improved?’  Interviewees were then asked 
about their attitudes to new housebuilding, the extent to which this translated into 
opposition activity (e.g. formally opposing planning applications, membership of a 
wider opposition group or network), and perceptions of the likely effectiveness of 
different types of opposition.  Financial payments were presented as one of a 
number of options for reducing opposition, including having more of a say over 
development and investment in local infrastructure and services.   
 
The direct payment question 
21. The study team were aware of the potential impact of the language used in 
questions and the contextual information provided.  The question on the amount 
required to change behaviour towards development has some similarity to the 
Willingness to Accept stated preference method but is not necessarily a formal 
application of stated preference techniques2.  Direct financial payment was framed 
as a mechanism for allowing residents to gain a direct share of the benefits of 
development.  The interview guide indicated that the payment would be for all 
                                            
 
2
 For more on the benefits of Willingness to Accept methods in situations where revealed preference cannot 
be located see HM Treasury (2011) and the differences between Willingness to Accept and Willingness to 
Pay studies in the evidence review below. 
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households in a given catchment area regardless of whether they opposed 
development (the catchment areas was specified as 100-200m from sites in urban 
areas but more extensive in some contexts.  Interviewees were asked their views 
on the scale of the catchment area).  Payment would be made when development 
commenced.   
 
22. The idea of direct financial payments was introduced in a standard format to all 
households, as follows: 
 
23. We would now like to explore whether your views might change if you were given a 
direct payment that would allow you to share some of the financial benefits of the 
new housing development. 
 
 The idea is that households might consider housing development differently and 
be less likely to oppose it if some of the benefit could be passed directly to them. 
 A payment would be made to you if your council agreed to the development 
going ahead and when construction started. 
 It would not affect any contributions that the developer makes for infrastructure, 
facilities and services.  
 All households who lived close to the site (distance dependent on site) would be 
given the payment regardless of whether they opposed the development or not. 
 
24. Households were first asked whether a direct financial payment might reduce their 
opposition to new housebuilding and were then asked to specify a payment (at that 
stage there were no suggested levels of payment).  If the specified figure was 
above £5000 households were asked about whether a payment of £5000 or below 
would be sufficient to reduce their opposition to new development.  Households 
were then asked if payment via council tax rebate would be more or less preferable 
to a lump sum paid into their bank account.  Direct financial payment was presented 
as an additional payment over and above current developer contributions. 
 
Accounting for bias 
25. Qualitative interviewing allowed the research team to examine the reasons for the 
answers given by households and address potential bias.  For example, it is 
possible that some respondents might have been trying to influence the direction of 
housing and planning policy or justify their prior opposition to development.  It is 
also important to recognise that this was a theoretical exercise and that the 
households involved in the study (those likely to oppose new development) may 
well be more critical of direct financial payments than would the general population.  
Moreover, although households were asked to respond with a particular site in 
mind, the study was more detached and abstact than a real scenario with actual 
payment.   
 
Key professional interviews  
 
26. The key professional interviews were intended to help contextualise the 
householder interviews and gauge responses to the practicalities of financial 
payments and implications for the planning system.  Key professional interviews 
included senior planning officers, key elected members (where possible the chair of 
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planning committee), and a mix of other stakeholders with a perspective on 
opposition to new housebuilding (such as representatives of amenity/opposition 
groups, local developers and other additional elected members).  For the two 
Neighbourhood Planning areas, key professionals included a representative of the 
Neighbourhood Planning forum and local authority contacts.  A total of 22 key 
professional interviews were undertaken (see Table 2.3) mostly by telephone.  
Interviews with key professionals varied from 30 minutes to 90 minutes.  The 
majority of interviews took one hour. 
 
Table 2.3: Key professional interviews 
  N SE SW E IL LC Total 
LA officer 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 
LA member 1 1 1 2 1 1 7 
Other 1 0 3 1 1 1 7 
NP forum 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Total 4 3 5 4 3 3 22 
   27. In total, the key professional interviews involved 6 local authority officers, 7 elected 
members, 3 developers/consultants, 4 representatives from resident/amenity 
groups or parish/town councils, and 2 representatives of Neighbourhood Planning 
fora. As stated before, the interviews provided a range of views to elucidate the 
potential issues in relation to Development Benefits. The views cannot be 
considered representative of all professionals. 
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3. Evidence review 
 
 
28. There is very limited practical experience or theoretical evidence in relation to 
financial payments aimed at reducing opposition to new development (housing or 
otherwise).  The evidence review therefore examined five sources of potential 
evidence about the impact of financial payments on opposition to new 
housebuilding: 
 
1. Hypothetical and theoretical studies of the impact of payments on the willingness 
to accept unpopular development; 
2. Literature on willingness to pay/willingness to accept direct payments; and 
3. Evidence from the use of community benefits policy in the UK. 
4. Evidence about reasons for opposing new housebuilding in the UK and 
internationally. 
5. Evidence from the British Social Attitudes Survey 
 
29. The following section summarises the findings of the evidence review (see Annex A 
for the full review). 
 
 
Hypothetical and theoretical studies 
 
30. There are limited hypothetical and theoretical studies of the impact of direct 
payments on willingness to accept unpopular development.  Shelter’s submission to 
the Wolfson Prize 2014 is the most relevant to the research (Shelter, 2014).  Focus 
groups and a citizens’ jury were used to assess the potential impact of direct 
payments on support for a Garden City in the South East of England.  The study 
found that a direct payment of below £5,000 was not viewed as significant enough 
to change people’s minds about development; and that direct payments may 
increase opposition as people feel they are being bought off or the money 
represents a bribe.  
 
Willingness to pay/accept studies 
31. Studies of willingness to pay (WTP) to prevent development and willingness to 
accept a financial payment (WTA) in compensation are the economic literature 
closest to the use of individual financial payments to reduce opposition to new 
housing development.  However there are no directly relevant WTA studies as WTA 
has tended to focus on non-housing issues.  Relevant studies of WTP to prevent 
new housing development are dated and only relate to the USA.  
 
Pricing amenity value 
32. Hedonic studies have sought to price amenities in order to compensate for planning 
permission: the house (e.g. garden); neighbourhood (e.g. parks, trees, local shops, 
leisure facilities); and location (e.g. access to jobs).  However, there are limitations 
in these attempts to value amenity accurately.  The assumptions of hedonic studies 
are rarely tested in practice. 
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Evidence from community benefits policy 
 
33. The experience of community benefits in relation to UK energy infrastructure 
projects is not necessarily equivalent to the individual payments considered in this 
study, but there are potential lessons that can be drawn from their application.  It is 
too early to draw clear lessons about the role of community benefits in reducing 
opposition.  In relation to wind farms Cowell et al (2011) suggest that ‘there is 
limited evidence to suggest that providing community benefits changes opinions 
about development … indeed, there is often more obvious anxiety that such gains 
should not subvert planning decisions'.  Community benefits may be seen as a form 
of ‘compensation’ rather than ‘benefit’ and this might reduce their social 
acceptability.   
 
 
Opposition to new housebuilding 
 
Opposition to new housebuilding and financial compensation 
34. A wide range of literature suggests that opposition to new development is likely to 
be motivated by concerns that cannot be assuaged through financial payment.  
Literature on ‘NIMBYism’ has demonstrated the importance of issues such as 
identity, principles and amenity value.  Bell et al (2005) suggest that ‘before policy 
makers choose to adopt a financial incentive strategy [to reduce opposition to 
development] they need to be sure that they are dealing with […] people whose 
principles are for sale’. 
 
Who opposes and what makes for effective opposition? 
35. Middle class, affluent individuals and groups are more likely to oppose new 
housebuilding.  Home owners are more likely to oppose development than private 
renters because of their greater ‘place dependence’.  These groups are often 
advantaged in their ability to influence local planning process, but not always.  
Sturzaker (2010) documents the power of rural elites to influence planning policy in 
England.  Conversely While et al (2004) demonstrate how in Cambridgeshire a 
coalition of local authorities, economic interests and supportive local residents were 
able to ‘outmanoeuvre’ previously strong rural opposition to new housebuilding.  
There is very limited research on the role played by local councillors in opposition to 
new house building in the UK.   
 
36. Overall there is a deficit of systematic evidence on the reasons for opposition, the 
overall scale of opposition, its geographical patterning and its net impact on 
decision-making 
 
Evidence from the British Social Attitudes Survey 
 
37. The 2014 British Social Attitudes (BSA) survey series provides some evidence that 
public opposition to new housing development has reduced.  The percentage of 
those who would support or strongly support new housebuilding in their local area 
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increased from 28% (2010) through 47% (2013) to 56% in 2014.  The level of 
opposition to more new housebuilding in the local area fell from 46% (2010) through 
31% (2013) to 21% in 2014.   
 
38. The BSA reports low levels of support for the use of financial payments in helping to 
reduce opposition and build support for more new housebuilding.  In BSA 2010 only 
1.7% of households who did not support more new housebuilding felt that a 
financial incentive to existing residents as a potential benefit would make them 
support more homes in the area.  In BSA 2013 this figure was 1.8%. 
 
39. The BSA 2014 asked about financial incentives as a stand-alone question, rather 
than in a list of potential benefits as above. Of respondents who did not support new 
homes in their local area only 2% said they would become much more supportive if 
households who lived close to a proposed development were given a cash payment 
if the development went ahead, while 16 per cent said they would be more 
supportive. The majority of respondents at 65 per cent stated a cash payment 
would make no difference to their level of support, whilst a significant minority at 12 
per cent would become more opposed to development and 4 per cent much more 
opposed. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
40. The main findings from the evidence review are: 
 
 There is limited empirical or theoretical evidence that is directly relevant to direct 
payments aimed at reducing opposition to new development.   
 
 Theoretical work that has been undertaken suggests that direct financial 
payments are unlikely to influence the attitudes or behaviour of those most 
opposed to new housebuilding and may lead to concerns about due process in 
determining planning applications.   
 
 Some of the concerns about new housing development that lead to opposition 
are unlikely to be assuaged by a financial payment, whilst the offer of payment 
itself could potentially increase opposition. 
 
 There is limited systematic analysis and detailed understanding of the reasons 
why people oppose new housebuilding and what might be done to reduce that 
opposition.  Academic and policy literature tends to focus on cases of conflict 
and opposition rather than agreement and consensus building. 
 
 Hypothetical studies of financial payment are strongly influenced by nuances in 
the language used and suggested levels of payment. 
 
41. The full findings of the evidence review and full references are provided in Annex A.   
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4. Household interview analysis  
 
 
42. The analysis presented in this section follows the order of questioning asked within 
the interviews (see Annex C for interview topic guide). 
 
Strength of opposition and reasons for opposition 
 
43. Pre-screening questions ensured that all of those interviewed would “be likely to 
oppose some aspect of new housebuilding in their local area”.  Questions 
were asked about the strength of attitudes and the likelihood of actively opposing 
development.  Interviewees were also asked if they had opposed development 
previously. 
 
44. Although all households interviewed were deemed to be opposed to new 
housebuilding, through their responses the study recorded the strength of 
opposition on a 3 point ‘opposition spectrum’.  Overall, 25% of those interviewed 
said that they would be very strongly opposed to new housebuilding in their local 
area and a further 44% said that they would be strongly opposed.  The remaining 
31% were less strongly opposed to new housebuilding but had some level of 
opposition (Table 4.1). 
 
 
Table 4.1: Would you be opposed to new housebuilding (or a particular aspect of new 
housebuilding) in your local area? 
 
E N IL SE LC SW Total % 
Weaker opposition 5 5 6 3 6 9 34 31% 
Strongly opposed 16 8 8 7 4 5 48 44% 
Very strong 2 2 3 6 9 5 27 25% 
Total 23 15 17 16 19 19 109 
  
 
45. The strength of opposition to new housebuilding in their local area varied across the 
case studies.  The South West case study registered the highest proportion at the 
weaker end of the opposition spectrum; the South East case study had the highest 
proportion that of those who appered to be strongly opposed (nearly 50%).   
 
46. Households reported that they were mainly opposed to the scale of new 
development and its perceived impact on the local area.  In areas that had 
experienced high levels of new housing development in recent years – notably SW, 
SE and LC – households were particularly concerned about the scale of 
development proposed and the impact on infrastructure, health services and 
schools:    
 
“Yes. There is a big development [name]. It looks like a toy town and there are no 
local services. It seems that this is the way they build now, without thinking of the 
utilities that people need, like local shops. It is imposing a huge number of houses 
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on a small town. The schools can’t cope. In the next 10 years, the Upper school will 
all be on one site, which will be massive even without extra kids coming in. It’s 
difficult to get appointments at the doctors.” (SE) 
 
“The amount of traffic concerns me. Everywhere you go is new housing estates. It is 
difficult to even turn out of our house, especially during rush hour.” (LC) 
 
“So when they’re talking about new housing developments, that’s great if you have 
infrastructure: schools and roads and GP practices. The schools have been great – 
the surgeries are great. It’s not about their quality of service, it’s their capacity 
really.” (SW) 
 
47. In the Inner London case study the main concerns were the scale and high density 
of new housing developments and the limited provision of housing considered 
affordable for local residents: 
 
“It’s all private tower blocks, I’m only opposed because it’s not for normal people, 
the average rents are £300 a week, it’s not affordable. In this area it’s all tower 
blocks along the canal, it’s way beyond what people can afford.” (IL) 
 
48. The perceived pricing out of local housing needs was also a cause for concern for 
around 10% of households in the other case-studies: 
 
Our concern is whether the price of the houses that are being put up are really 
within reach of young people.” (LC) 
 
49. Concerns about design quality and the loss of local character were also mentioned 
by around a quarter of residents in all areas: 
 
… It just seems like this area is being swamped with the volume of houses. Slowly 
but surely, its turning into one big sprawl. We will lose the village and community 
feel of the place … (LC) 
 
“We get so much new development in [PLACE] which is low “value” and doesn’t 
look great. When you see it on the plans it seems brilliant but when built there are 
cut backs to the quality and design and the Council is always disappointed but it 
happens again and again.” (E). 
 
“It needs to be done sympathetically. I accept that we do need houses. The 
development on the [SITE] was nicely done and that was OK” (LC) 
 
 
Attitudes and behaviour in opposition to new housebuilding 
 
50. 55% of respondents indicated they were likely to act on their concerns and would 
formally oppose development through the planning system.  A further 10% said they 
might act on their concerns depending on the location and type of development and 
17% did not know (Table 4.2).  Overall 18% said that they were unlikely to take 
formal action in opposition to housing development.  However the proportion of 
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households unlikely to act on their opposition to new housing development was 
significantly higher in Inner London (50%).    
 
 
Table 4.2: Would households act on their opposition to new housing development? 
 
E N IL SE LC SW Total % 
Yes 17 8 8 7 9 11 60 55% 
Maybe 2 4 0 0 2 3 11 10% 
No 3 0 7 1 5 4 20 18% 
Don't know 1 3 2 8 3 1 18 17% 
Total 23 15 17 16 19 19 109 
  
 
51. Opposition would mainly take the form of registering formal objections to planning 
applications, but a number of households said that they would attend meetings or 
contact councillors.  Most households had not been strongly involved in organising 
campaigns against new housebuilding.  The relatively high proportion of don’t 
knows in the SE is because application for significant housebuilding are still mainly 
at proposal stage in that area.   
 
52. 44% of households interviewed had previously opposed new housing development 
(Table 4.3).  Again, households in Inner London were less likely to have opposed 
new housing proposals than households in the other case study areas.    
 
 
Table 4.3: Have you previously opposed new housing development? 
 
E N IL SE LC SW Total % 
Yes 0 10 6 9 10 7 42 44% 
No 23 3 11 1 5 11 54 56% 
No answer 0 2 0 6 4 1 13 
 Total 23 15 17 16 19 19 109 
  
 
 
The influence of neighbours, friends, family and local 
campaign groups 
 
53. Households were asked ‘to what extent is your attitude to new housing 
development influenced by other people, such as neighbours, friends or family 
members or local campaign groups?’    
 
54. Within the case studies forms of opposition varied from well organised campaigns 
to more localised mobilization via social media, petitions, meetings and individual 
comments on planning applications.  Well organised community scrutiny and 
campaigns were more evident in LC and E reflecting a longer history of opposition 
to high levels of new development.  In a small number of cases elected members 
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had been involved in opposition campaigns, but were not mentioned in the majority 
of interviews. 
 
55. Whilst a small number of respondents had been influenced by campaigns and 
discussion with friends, over 90% of respondents felt that opposition was a personal 
matter.  The following responses were typical of that view: 
 
“Not at all, I have my own opinions. Most people are against it, but that doesn’t 
sway my opinion.” (SW) 
 
“I have my own mind they wouldn’t influence me; I have my own belief in terms of 
the correct course of action.” (E) 
 
56. There was evidence of active mobilisation through campaign groups and amenity 
societies in most localities, but most interviewees said they were not strongly 
influenced by formal campaigns.   
 
 
Knowledge of the planning system and ability to influence it 
 
57. Interviewees were asked about their knowledge of the planning system and their 
understanding of the role that they could play in influencing the planning of new 
housing in their local area.  Interviewees were asked ‘to what extent do you believe 
that local residents can get the council to refuse or change proposed developments 
that are submitted?’ 
 
58. Respondents tended to feel that they had a good knowledge of the planning system 
and the mechanisms for opposing development.  However there was a strong 
feeling across all case studies that the ability of residents to oppose new housing 
was limited.  Generally, interviewees did not feel confident about their ability to 
prevent development even when there was strong community mobilization.   
 
“It doesn’t matter a dot what we think. They’re [the local authority] not interested; 
they just tell us what’s going to happen. Local residents can’t change anything – it’s 
money that’s talking.” (LC) 
 
“Very limited, you can put in a complaint but if it’s a private development they will 
always employ a lawyer or someone to find a way round it, by tweaking the rules or 
threatening to tie the council up in a court case. People need somewhere to live and 
if there’s an objection there’s always a way round it. The Council has no influence 
or feels their hands are tied.” (IL) 
 
“I have the tendency to think that this is what the government wants, and no if you 
look at the example of [place] - when they had the planning meeting, two of our 
district councilors … were against it. They had something like 300 online objections 
and they had something like five that approved so when the decision came – oh 
we’ve got five that approved, we’ll go ahead with it. So did residents have a voice? 
No.” (SW) 
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“I can play no role at all in influencing planning. There’s nothing I can do as the 
council don’t care. I feel totally helpless and ignored as a citizen. This is a 
consensus in the community.” (LC) 
 
“I would like to think that we could change the proposed development if we pull 
together… but I think they have already decided and they are going through the 
formalities.” (E) 
 
59. Where opposition had been successful it was felt to take considerable effort by 
individuals and campaign groups: 
 
“In my experience residents have been successful but they have to put in an 
extraordinary amount of effort, it’s not enough just to write in, they have to 
understand on what basis they are objecting and whether it’s a reasonable 
objection. In areas like this it’s difficult to get a critical mass but my sense is that 
they can get cowed and don’t feel they have a chance, whereas I feel that if you 
have a strong case it only takes one person to make it, but you have to be 
committed – time, effort, attending meetings, it’s hard.” (IL) 
 
60. There was felt to be less leverage over elected members than in the past: 
 
“One of the Councilors has told me the reason why they can’t or won’t oppose new 
housing. The Government is telling them to put these houses up, as they have 
targets. In a way they’re at their wits end trying to try and find places to build these 
houses as nobody wants them. They blame the Government.” (SW) 
 
61. Regardless of the likely outcome from the planning process, the principle of 
opposing development was perceived to be important by around 10% of 
respondents: 
 
“I think you are limited in terms of influence but I believe the louder and longer you 
shout things may change.” (E) 
 
62. 20% of respondents indicated that they could have a medium or significant role in 
influencing the planning of new housing, whilst 42% thought that they would have a 
limited impact and 26% indicated that they would not be able to have any impact 
(see Table 4.4). 
 
 
Table 4.4: What is your understanding of the role that you can play in influencing the 
planning of new housing in your local area? 
 
E N IL SE LC SW Total % 
Significant 0 0 2 0 0 1 3 3% 
Medium 1 6 3 2 3 4 19 17% 
Limited 10 6 5 9 6 10 46 42% 
None 7 1 4 5 9 2 28 26% 
Don't know 5 2 3 0 1 2 13 12% 
Total 23 15 17 16 19 19 109 
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What might help reduce household opposition to new 
housebuilding? 
 
63. Prior to asking about individual financial payments, interviewees were asked 
whether other government policy interventions might make them less opposed to, or 
more supportive of, new housebuilding. 
 
64. 53% of households said that having more of a say over design and layout of 
development might make them less opposed to new housebuilding (32% yes, 21% 
maybe) (Table 4.5).  That proportion was slightly lower (48% or 33% yes, 15% 
maybe) for those most strongly opposed to new housebuilding. 
 
Table 4.5: Would you be less opposed to new housebuilding if if you could have more of a 
say over the design and layout of development at the planning stage? 
 
E N IL SE LC SW Total % 
Yes 6 6 7 6 5 5 35 32% 
Maybe 5 5 1 3 5 4 23 21% 
No 8 3 8 4 3 7 33 30% 
Don't know 4 1 1 3 6 3 18 17% 
Total 23 15 17 16 19 19 109 
  
 
65. 59% of households said that they were likely to be less opposed to new 
housebuilding if there was more investment in infrastructure and services (44% yes, 
15% maybe) (Table 4.6).  The proportion of those who would be less likely to 
oppose new housebuilding was slightly higher (66% or 44% yes, 22% maybe) for 
those most strongly opposed to new housebuilding. 
 
Table 4.6: Would you take be less opposed to new housebuilding if more money was 
provided to help fund local public services such as transport, education, health and/or 
environmental facilities? 
 
E N IL SE LC SW Total % 
Yes 7 6 7 8 7 13 48 44% 
Maybe 5 2 1 2 5 1 16 15% 
No 8 6 6 4 3 2 29 27% 
Don't know 3 1 3 2 4 3 16 15% 
Total 23 15 17 16 19 19 109 
  
 
66. 39% of households indicated that there were other considerations that would make 
them less opposed to new housing in their local area, notably this included the 
provision of social housing (though some also wanted less social housing in new 
developments close to them) and/or ensuring that housing was affordable for 
younger residents (Table 4.7).  
 
 
 25 
Table 4.7: If there anything else that would make you less opposed to new housing 
development in your local area? 
 
E N IL SE LC SW Total % 
Yes 6 5 5 5 3 6 30 28% 
Maybe 9 1 1 0 1 0 12 11% 
No 4 5 9 8 6 11 43 39% 
Don't know 4 4 2 3 9 2 24 22% 
Total 23 15 17 16 19 19 109 
  
Extent to which individual financial payments might change 
attitudes or behaviour 
 
67. Households were asked ‘if you were to receive a financial payment if new housing 
development went ahead, would you be less likely to oppose the development?’  
 
68. 10% of respondents (11 in total) said that they would or might be less likely to 
oppose new housing development if they were to receive a direct financial payment 
linked to the development; 6% said yes, 4% said maybe (Table 4.8).  
 
 
Table 4.8: If you were to receive a financial payment if new housing development went 
ahead, would you be less likely to oppose the development? 
 
E N IL SE LC SW Total % 
Yes 1 1 2 1 0 2 7 6% 
Maybe 0 1 0 0 1 2 4 4% 
No 19 11 15 13 17 15 91 84% 
Don't know 3 1 0 2 1 0 7 6% 
Total 23 15 17 16 19 19 109 
  
 
69. The eleven households who said they would or might be influenced by a direct 
payment can be divided into three groups: 
 
i. There were three households in local authority/social housing and at the medium to 
weaker end of the opposition spectrum who specified a payment of £1,000-2,000.  
 
ii. A second group consists of five owner occupier households on incomes of £30K or 
more. For this group the payment would need to be at least £5,000 to reduce their 
opposition to new development and in most cases more than £5,000 (five 
households).  This group tended towards the middle of the opposition spectrum.  
One of those households (income of £30-39K) felt that £5,000 was an “inviting sum 
of money” that could “compensate for the inconvenience”.  One of the owner-
occupier households said they might be influenced by a payment but were 
uncomfortable with the principle: “that’s coming at it in the wrong way … to pay 
people is completely undemocratic” (N, £50-59K income).   
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iii. Two households are strong opponents of new housing development but said that a 
direct payment would reduce their opposition if the payment allowed them to move 
(i.e. covered moving costs).  These two households would require at least £5,000. 
These two households felt that new housing development would proceed 
regardless of local opposition. 
 
70. Two of the households who specified a payment of over £5,000 felt that the level of 
payment should relate to the impact of new housebuilding on individual properties:  
 
I think it’s a really good idea…. It depends, if people are being affected more, they 
should get more money.” (N) 
 
71. Impact was defined as a combination of loss of amenity value and reduction in 
house value if that occurred. 
 
72. There was some indication that the reality of an actual payment might complicate 
household attitudes and behaviour.  For example one householder who was 
opposed to payment in principle was likely to accept a payment of £5000 if it was on 
offer: 
 
 “Yes it probably would [make a difference to attitude]. Nasty isn’t it.... I’m retired 
and on a pension. It would be a little windfall” (SW) 
 
73. That respondent was uncertain whether the payment would reduce their opposition 
to new housing development. 
 
74. There were no significant geographical variations in attitudes to the financial 
payment. Respondents who said that payments would reduce their opposition to 
housing development were mainly those at the weaker end of the opposition 
spectrum and/or on lower incomes.  There was some evidence of a correlation 
between the amount required to reduce their opposition to new housing and 
household income, but given the limited number of households who would accept 
the payment no precise correlation can be determined.  See Annex D for more 
detail on households who would or might reduce their opposition to new 
housebuilding if there was a financial payment.    
 
 
Reasons why payments would not influence attitudes and 
behaviour 
 
75. 84% said that a direct financial payment would not alter their attitudes or behaviour 
with respect to new housing development.  Some of those felt that the level of 
payment would have to be so large as to be unaffordable for those making the 
payment: 
 
“It would need to be so enormous; they are not going to give everyone enough to 
move. It’s irrelevant. Small amounts are not an incentive.” (LC) 
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76. There was a strong reaction amongst households against the principle of financial 
payments.  Bribery terminology3 was mentioned in more than 46% of interviews in 
relation to the direct payment.  The following quotes give a sense of the reaction: 
 
“Is that because your house may be de-valued? I feel quite negative about it. I think 
it sounds like bribery. It doesn’t negate my concerns. It sounds like paying residents 
to agree with what developers want to do. I feel pretty annoyed about it. I think once 
people start exchanging money like that, how much is out in the open? You wonder 
how much is going on behind the scenes- corruption. I think that is a very slippery 
slope.” (LC) 
 
“To be given the offer of a payment doesn’t sound right. It’s unfair, it is buying 
people off. Regardless of your opinion, if you are given money, it negates your right 
to express an opinion. I wouldn’t take it. It would feel like blood money.” (SE) 
 
“I think it’s disgusting and I am absolutely appalled that they are trying to pay people 
off to get them on their side” (N) 
 
“I wouldn’t agree with any incentives however they are presented – I think it is 
bribery just because they don’t agree with something you can’t just chuck money at 
it that is buying people” (E) 
 
77. Two households felt that residents should be compensated financially for the loss of 
amenity arising from new housing development but did not like the idea of a 
payment that might influence decisions about planning permission. 
 
 
Additional concerns about direct financial payments  
 
78. A number of interviewees felt that the payment could be divisive:   
 
“Jealousy may arise, if some people get £X where others don’t. People shouldn’t be 
paid off.  However we must have new houses, but it needs to be done sensibly and 
properly.”(LC) 
 
“I think that’s disgraceful. That’s paying people to change their mind. That’s wrong. 
So if somebody says I don’t want a housing estate. So if I give you £500 do you 
want one now? Isn’t that wrong? If you take a hundred metre distance from the new 
development – so the poor person who’s 100.5 doesn’t get their money. Whenever 
you draw a boundary line you’re going to always get an issue. So that’s not looking 
at the bigger picture.”(SW) 
 
“I think it could cause really bad feeling, if one gets it and another doesn’t. It would 
stop some people fully exploring their options. It almost breaks up a community by 
giving cash to people” (LC) 
                                            
 
3
 Bribery terminology includes derivatives of: “bribe”, “corruption”, “being bought off” or 
“backhander” in a negative context. It does not include respondents who indicated that they were 
against financial payment in principle, but did not stipulate what the principle was. 
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79. A number of households felt that direct payments to households would divert 
resource from investment in local infrastructure and public services  
 
“Where would that money come from? It’s a difficult one. Funds are low for 
everyone. Is it affecting a fund that was meant for something else? They don’t just 
give money away with no repercussions, something has to give.” (LC) 
 
 “I disagree with that form of incentive. I see it as a form of bribery. I would much 
rather they put in three houses for the elderly or people with learning difficulties as 
there is a social benefit of it. It just doesn’t seem logical to me.” (SW) 
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5. Key professional interviews 
 
 
80. As outlined in Section 2, the 22 “key professionals” interviewed for the study were a 
mix of senior planning officers, key elected members and other stakeholders with a 
perspective on opposition to new housebuilding (such as representatives of 
amenity/opposition groups, local developers and other additional elected members).  
Interviewees included a housing developer and a consultant mainly working for 
housebuilders.  They provide a range of views; however, these cannot be 
considered representative of all professionals and are therefore not generalisable. 
 
81. These key professionals were asked a range of questions in relation to: the form 
and impact of opposition to new housebuilding in their locality; the main reasons 
why residents oppose new housing development; the response of elected members 
to opposition; the extent to which financial payments are likely to reduce opposition 
to new homes in the local authority area or speed up decision-making; other options 
available that might be more effective in reducing opposition; and the possible wider 
impacts of the policy approach. 
 
 
Levels of support for financial payments 
 
82. Overall there was no significant support for direct financial payments from any of 
the twenty two key professionals interviewed.  All were opposed to the principle 
and/or highlighted practical difficulties with the policy.  At best, it was felt that such 
payments could have a marginal impact in some cases (perhaps easing the 
progress of some proposals a little) but this would be outweighed by the other, 
negative, effects of the policy.   
 
83. There was significant concern amongst all interviewees, including the housing 
developers and consultants, that financial payments would diminish trust in the local 
planning process and this could make it more difficult to secure planning 
permission.  These concerns about trust were most marked in areas where local 
authorities had worked hard to make the case for new housebuilding.   
 
84. Local government officers and members all felt that financial payments could be 
divisive because the impact of development often extends beyond the catchment 
area and outside of the geographical area intended for such payments.  In SW it 
was felt that financial payments would “inflame and antagonise” (local authority 
officer, SW) and “send ripples through communities” (developer, SW).  All of the key 
professionals felt that it would be difficult to determine or justify the catchment area 
of payment. 
 
85. There were also concerns amongst local government representatives that financial 
payments could undermine community cohesion and foster conflict around new 
housebuilding: 
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“it puts people in an invidious position with their neighbours and will divide 
communities, creating more conflict rather than less” (elected member, E). 
 
 “[DB payments] … would be hugely divisive and would create issues of 
disenchantment within the community.” (Neighbourhood Planning forum, N) 
 
86. Financial payments were perceived as impacting negatively on development 
viability and provision for infrastructure, as funding “will have to come off someone’s 
budget” (local authority officer, E).  There was a preference within local authorities 
for spending extra resource on infrastructure and services as this was often the 
major concern with new housebuilding: 
 
“If money is available, it would be better spent on people’s real concerns - 
infrastructure and education” (NP forum, SE). 
 
87. In certain authorities (particularly LC, E, SE and IL) key professionals also 
expressed concern that financial payments might serve to undermine local political 
commitment to planning proactively for new housebuilding.  In this respect there 
was concern that the proposal showed little appreciation of work that had gone into 
generating local acceptance of the need to plan positively for a five-year supply of 
housing land. 
 
88. As in the householder interviews, there was concern that financial payments could 
be seen “as a form of bribery” (Parish Council representative, E):  
 
“I would be appalled if people – residents and/or elected members -- were not 
allowed to give their views freely and unquestionably in relation to the democratic 
process. Where there are legitimate planning concerns they should stand on their 
own merits, and not be swayed by financial concerns.” (elected member, E).  
 
89. In LC a local authority member cautioned against giving the impression of ‘buying 
and selling of planning permission’.  Conversely the housing developer was 
concerned that financial payment might be construed as compensation, potentially 
reinforcing the negative perception of new housing development. 
 
90. All of the key professionals felt that the financial incentives were unlikely to 
influence those most opposed to decisions and who were most active in their 
opposition.   
 
“for many communities here, the sort of payment likely to be offered by Development 
Benefits would be loose change, derisory.” (local authority officer, SW). 
 
“… no one [here] would be influenced by 5K, especially if they knew they were going to 
get it anyway.” (NP forum, N) 
 
91. The developer also questioned whether the payment would be able to achieve its 
goal of reducing opposition if it does not “lead to withdrawal of objection” 
(housebuilder, SW).   
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Were they any circumstances where financial payments 
might be considered beneficial? 
 
92. Three of the key professionals (two developers and one local authority officer) felt 
that financial payments might be useful in a limited number of contexts, but not 
necessarily in the areas where opposition is most influential: 
 
 “it’s a nice idea that might work in some HMAs but not high value areas.” 
(housebuilder, SW) 
 
“I could imagine it being useful for some sites but not for any of ours.” (local 
authority officer, IL) 
 
93. When pressed those key professionals were unable to suggest particular sites 
where financial payments could make a difference. 
 
 
When is opposition a problem? 
 
94. Local authorities were concerned about opposition always being portrayed as a 
problem.  Local Planning Authorities all felt that the National Planning Policy 
Framework (NPPF) made it less likely that local opposition would slow down or 
prevent development that was in conformity with national and local planning policy.  
In SW, developers and local planning officers both recognised that there had been 
a change in planning stance; applications that “ordinarily would have been refused, 
are now being approved” (local authority officer). Key professionals all felt that local 
opposition to new housebuilding was less likely to succeed following publication of 
the NPPF.  It was felt that the NPPF has made it more difficult for local authorities to 
refuse applications that are in conformity with national or local planning policy. 
 
95. Opposition can put considerable pressure on local elected members, particularly at 
election time.  However in E and LC there was evidence that well organised 
opposition campaigns had not prevented land allocations being made in local plans 
or prevented planning permission being granted.  Chairs of planning committees 
emphasized that their role was to remain impartial in weighing up decisions. This 
view was confirmed by residents who were active in campaign groups. There was a 
feeling that assumptions underlying a financial payments policy might overestimate 
the role and effectiveness of local opposition in relation to specific development 
proposals. 
 
96. A number of interviewees advocated the benefits of legitimate opposition in helping 
to work through concerns about new housebuilding and support better proposals.  
In E opposition was seen as “promoting good debate and principled argument about 
genuine issues” (elected member), often resulting in positive improvements to 
developments.  Planning officers in SW noted that “opposition shouldn’t be 
dismissed. People’s experience of housing development is poor and this is what 
needs to be addressed”.  
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Financial payments and neighbourhood planning 
 
97. If anything, financial payments were felt to be potentially more divisive in 
Neighbourhood Planning areas because of potential conflicts between payments to 
individuals and collective investment in infrastructure and services.  Neighbourhood 
Planning was felt to rely on a collective understanding and agreement about how 
best to meet local housing needs.  Financial payments were also felt to be 
insufficient to make a meaningful contribution to individual households if pooled and 
distributed across a wider area.  Key professionals involved in Neighbourhood 
Planning saw a potential conflict between collective investment and individual 
payments. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
98. This report has presented findings from research on the potential impact of financial 
payments on household attitudes and behavior and on planning for new 
housebuilding.  The research has focused particularly on whether direct financial 
payment to individuals most likely to oppose house building is likely to reduce local 
opposition to residential development. 
 
99. The research has produced attitudinal evidence about: 
 
 Attitudes and behavior towards new housebuilding; 
 
 Household knowledge of the planning system and what might reduce opposition;  
 
 The potential response to financial payments amongst those who are likely to 
oppose development in a range of local and regional contexts; 
 
 The extent to which direct payments to individuals might influence the scale and 
scope of opposition to new housing development; 
 
 The motivations of those who oppose new housebuilding, including the 
relationship between financial payments and other interventions that might help 
to reduce levels of opposition; 
 
 The potential impact of financial payments on attitudes and behaviours amongst 
a sample of key professionals involved in the delivery of local planning for 
housing; and  
 
 The potential practical implications of the use of financial payments 
 
 
 
100. As emphasised throughout this report, when assessing the data and findings from 
the study it is important to account for the theoretical nature of the research, the 
particular framing of questions, and potential bias in household responses.  It is 
possible that some households involved in the study may be more critical of direct 
financial payments than the general population.  As in any Stated Preference study, 
responses will have been influenced by the wording of questions and the contextual 
information provided.  It should be noted therefore that a real scenario that involved 
actual payment would not necessarily generate the same response.   
 
101. With those caveats in mind, the key findings from the interviews are: 
 
In relation to household interviews (n=109):  
 
 A limited proportion of those interviewed (10%) said that a direct financial payment 
would or might reduce their opposition to housing development; 6% said it would, 4% 
said maybe.  The large majority (84%) felt that the payment would not influence their 
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views on housing development or their likelihood to engage in some form of direct or 
indirect opposition to it.   
 
 There was strong principled resistance to the idea of a financial payment amongst 
many households.  Financial payments were associated with ‘bribes’ by 46% of 
respondents.  There were also concerns by households that such payments could lead 
to a reduced developer contribution, especially as pressure on infrastructure and 
services was often the main reason for opposition to housing development.  
 
 The majority of those who said that a payment would or might reduce their opposition 
indicated that the payment would need to be greater than £5,000.  Those who would 
accept a payment of less than £5,000 tended to be on lower incomes and at the 
weakest end of the opposition spectrum. 
 
 Views on opposition to new housebuilding were mainly about the scale of development 
and its impact on local infrastructure and services.  Over one third of respondents said 
they would be less opposed to new development if they could have more of a say over 
development, or if there was extra resource for infrastructure and services (especially 
schools and health care).  There was evidence that those who oppose tend to oppose 
the scale and nature of development rather than new development per se.   
 
 There were mixed views on the perceived ability of residents to influence development.  
74% of those interviewed felt that individual residents had a limited ability to influence 
development.   
 
 Households generally found it easy to grasp the principles of the use of direct financial 
payments aimed at reducing opposition to new homes. 
 
In relation to key professional interviews (n=22): 
 
 There was no significant support for direct financial payments from any of the key 
professionals interviewed.  At best, it was felt that such payments would have a 
marginal impact in specific circumstances (perhaps easing the progress of some 
proposals a little in some special cases).  
 
 It was felt that potential benefits of financial payments would be outweighed by the 
other, negative, effects.  The main concern was that payments might undermine trust in 
local planning processes.  There was a feeling that payments could be divisive and 
weaken community cohesion.  There were particular concerns that payments could 
undermine work undertaken by Local Planning Authorities to build consensus and 
certainty around planning for new housebuilding. 
 
 Key professionals emphasized that opposition was an important part of the planning 
system and that it can be handled effectively through existing frameworks.  They also 
felt that the NPPF has made it less easy for new housing to be prevented or slowed 
down by opposition to planning within the local authority or amongst local residents.    
 
 Overall, households’ views were very consistent with those of the key professionals. 
The main differences are that households were much more critical of financial 
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payments from an ethical perspective and less likely to identify unintended, wider 
consequences. 
 
Areas for further consideration and research 
 
The initial research was a theoretical exercise and households may well respond 
differently when presented with real financial payments. However the research does raise 
a number of new research questions which could be posed to explore the potential impact 
of direct benefits in more depth in view of possible ‘deadweight’ losses of implementing 
and implications for additionality. 
 
 To what extent would eliminating opposition to house building allow additional 
schemes to be submitted to the planning system up stream of the points at which 
active opposition occurs? 
 
 Under what circumstances might development benefits in the form of financial 
payments be effective in securing support for house building, and for whom? 
Recognising that the majority of our sample of opposers felt financial payments would 
not influence their behaviour at less than £5,000 and viewed payments as bribes.  
 
 Are there other forms of development benefits other than financial payments that could 
change views on opposition (or neutral views)? For example, infrastructure, facilities or 
non-financial incentives (e.g. insulation, solar panels). 
 
 Is there a difference in opinion and opposition to development benefits based on who 
makes the payment and how the money is used, e.g. to reduce council tax? 
 
 Is there a role in nurturing the ability to engage in the planning system for those who 
currently support additional house building, but have no mechanism of engaging with 
the planning system, not simply changing the attitudes and behaviours of individuals 
who oppose house building to gain from additional units being submitted? 
 
 
 36 
 
Annex A: Evidence review  
 
 
There is very limited practical experience or theoretical evidence about the impact of direct 
financial payments on opposition to development (housing or otherwise) in the UK or 
internationally.   
 
The evidence review therefore considered five main sources of potential evidence with 
respect to the application of DB policy to reduce opposition in planning for housing: 
 
1. Hypothetical and theoretical studies of the impact of payments on the willingness to 
accept unpopular development; 
2. Literature on willingness to pay/willingness to accept direct payments; and 
3. Evidence from the use of community benefits policy in the UK. 
4. Evidence about reasons for opposing new housebuilding in the UK and 
internationally and the extent to which this might be influenced by direct financial 
payment. 
5. Evidence from the British Social Attitudes Survey 
 
 
Hypothetical and theoretical studies 
 
There is little or no evidence of directly relevant policy initiatives in the UK or elsewhere in 
the world.  However the issue of using financial payment to help reduce development 
opposition has been considered in a limited range of hypothetical and theoretical studies, 
notably: 
 
 Shelter’s submission to the Wolfson Prize 2014 assesses the potential impact of direct 
payments on support for a Garden City.  Evidence is derived from four Focus Groups 
(the submission does not specify the number of people involved, or the precise break 
down of participants, but they were divided into four groups: those aged 20-30 in 
private rental accommodation; owner-occupiers aged 31-60 with at least one child over 
16; residents of social housing aged 31-60 with at least one child over 16; and, those 
aged 60+ who are owner occupiers) and a Citizens’ Jury (the submission does not 
indicate the number of participants, but suggests that are a representative cross-
section of Medway).  The study found that a direct payment of below £5,000 was not 
viewed as significant enough to change people’s minds about development; and that 
direct payments may increase opposition as people feel they are being bought off or 
the money represents a bribe.  
 
 Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) found that, when residents were offered a financial 
payment as compensation for an unpopular development (a nuclear dump), the 
financial incentive crowded out civic duty in the recipients’ actions and led to a 
significant reduction (from 50% to 25%) in the proportion of people willing to accept that 
development.  However, the payment on offer may not have been enough to outweigh 
the altruistic feeling gained through acting in the wider public’s interest.  
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The theoretical and hypothetical studies may be of limited wider value because the effect 
described depends on the specific issue and the framing of the problem (e.g. Fehr and 
Hachter, 2002 in the case of voluntary services).  Given the heterogeneity of housing 
markets, local political discourses and oppositional perspectives, care is needed in 
applying insights from the literature across markets and circumstances. 
 
 
Evidence from community benefits policy 
 
Community benefits are now being used to help reduce opposition to energy facilities in 
the UK.  The experience of community benefits in relation to UK energy infrastructure 
projects is not necessarily equivalent to the individual payments considered in this study, 
but there are potential lessons that can be drawn from their application.  As Cowell et al 
(2011) point out, one rationale of community benefits ‘is to foster social acceptance: the 
belief that community benefits make communities more accepting of major new energy 
developments’.  However it is concluded that in practice ‘there is limited evidence to 
suggest that providing community benefits changes opinions about development … 
indeed, there is often more obvious anxiety that such gains should not subvert planning 
decisions' (see also Cass et al (2010) and Strachen and Jones (2011)).  Cowell et al 
(2011) suggest that community benefits tend to be seen as a form of ‘compensation’ rather 
than ‘benefit’ and this might reduce their social acceptability.  However that argument has 
not been systematically tested in practice.  
 
Willingness to pay/willingness to accept and direct payments 
Studies of willingness to pay (WTP) to prevent development and willingness to accept 
(WTA) a financial payment to put up with unpopular development are the economic 
literature closest to the use of individual financial payments to reduce opposition to new 
housing development.  Stated preference methods, such as WTA or WTP are used in 
cases where revealed preferences are unobservable or non-existent currently.  Where 
revealed preferences cannot be observed, stated preference studies are recommended by 
government (HM Treasury, 2011).  There are however, conceptual differences between 
WTA and WTP, notably in terms of the relation of the subject to the right and to the ability 
of the subject to make/receive a payment (Horowitz & McConnell, 2002; Hanemann, 
1991).  These differences lead to very different levels of estimated amounts that people 
are WTA and WTP in studies of the same issue.  The less ‘ordinary’ is the good, the 
greater is the likely difference between WTA and WTP.  For example, Horowitz & 
McConnell (2002, 428) find that in “the case of preserving land from development […] the 
mean WTA/WTP ratio is approximately 7”.  However the study assumes that the 
undeveloped land is owned by the subjects rather than its benefits being merely enjoyed 
by them.  Despite being more appropriate for the use of financial payments in relation to 
new house building there are no directly relevant WTA studies as WTA has tended to 
focus on non-housing issues (such as water reliability, e.g. Howe et al, 1994; MacDonald 
et al, 2010). 
 
The difference outlined above – i.e. the difference between levels of estimated amounts 
that people are WTA and WTP in studies of the same issue -- hinders the direct use of the 
small number of WTP studies which focus explicitly on people’s WTP to prevent new 
housing development.  In addition, the identified studies are dated and relate to the USA.  
In the 1980s Beasley et al (1986) estimated that, on average, households would be willing 
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to pay $144 pa. to prevent the residential and commercial development of agricultural land 
in close proximity to them (in Southern Alaska in 1983).  Breffle et al (1998) considered 
households’ WTP to preserve from development a 5.5 acre site on the edge of the built-up 
area of Boulder, Colorado in 1991.  Households within 0.1 miles of the site were WTP 
$1,197 in the form of a one-off payment.  The overall average WTP of households within 1 
mile of the site was $294.  
 
It is important to note that the policy under investigation is intended to reduce opposition to 
new house building by allowing households a direct share in the benefits of development.  
This is distinct from payments intended to compensate households for the loss of property 
or amenity value arising from new development. 
 
Pricing amenity value 
Whilst there is evidence that opposition is rarely a question simply of financial value or of a 
decline in amenity value, mainstream economists argue that amenity value can be priced. 
Those prices might provide the basis for a financial payment to offset perceived or actual 
loss of amenity through new development.  There is a large number of hedonic studies 
which focus variously on amenities related to: the house (e.g. garden); neighbourhood 
(e.g. parks, trees, local shops, leisure facilities); and location (e.g. access to jobs). 
However, there are two significant limitations to these attempts to value amenity 
accurately.  First, hedonic pricing models may be systematically inaccurate because they 
under-price some amenities that have psychic value as well as use/exchange value, and 
they rely on precise model specifications (for example knowing the full range of significant 
location and type variables).  Second, some aspects of amenity simply cannot be priced 
either at all or with any accuracy (e.g. sense of local identity), so policies informed by 
these artificially low (or no) prices may give rise to unintended consequences.  There is no 
evidence on whether a financial payment based on hypothecated loss of amenity value 
would reduce opposition to development.   
 
 
Understanding opposition to new housebuilding 
 
There are numerous studies on opposition to new housing and other forms of development 
in the UK and elsewhere (e.g. Dear, 1992; Fischel, 2001; Schively, 2007; Sturzaker, 2011 
and 2011; Inch, 2012).  However, there is a deficit of systematic evidence on the reasons 
for opposition, the overall scale of opposition, its geographical patterning and its net impact 
on decision-making.  
 
Community opposition has often been understood as a collective action problem.  It is 
widely viewed as a rational response for property owners whose property values and 
quality of life are negatively and directly affected by new housing to object to proposals, 
despite the wider collective benefits such development might bring (Leunig, 2007; Rydin & 
Pennington, 2000).   However, studies of third-party appeals against development in the 
Republic of Ireland (Ellis, 2004) and Australia (Cook et al, 2012) suggest that a variety of 
factors may motivate objection.  These range from a desire to exclude particular social 
groups from a neighbourhood, through cynicism and the pursuit of due process, to 
environmentally inspired altruism.  Opposition often reflects the combination of a range of 
factors and there is often not a clear delineation between different concerns. 
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Literature on ‘NIMBYism’ has demonstrated the importance of issues such as identity, 
principles and amenity value (Burningham, 2000; Bell et al, 2005; Burningham et al, 2006; 
Schively, 2007).  Additional factors include trust in government, and the degree of resident 
input and engagement (Wolsink, 2000).  Research has shown how opposition is influenced 
by type of development in a neighbourhood (Davison et al, 2013), emotional attachment to 
place, which may form individual and community identity (Devine-Wright, 2011) and the 
visibility (rather than proximity) of the site (Jones & Eiser, 2010).  Bell et al (2005) 
emphasise the importance of principles in opposition and suggest that ‘before policy 
makers choose to adopt a financial incentive strategy they need to be sure that they are 
dealing with […] people whose principles are for sale’. 
 
Middle class ‘sharp elbows’ 
Evidence suggests that middle class affluent individuals and groups are more likely to 
oppose new housebuilding and much more likely to act on their concerns.  Affluent 
individuals are likely to be in a position where the impact of loss of amenity and/or property 
value is felt to be of greater concern (Sturzaker, 2010).   
 
There is evidence that middle class, affluent individuals and groups are often advantaged 
in their ability to influence local public services to their advantage, and this has traditionally 
included local planning process.  As Hastings and Matthews (2011, 2) point out, middle 
class advantage ‘can be gained as a result of the deliberate actions and strategies of 
affluent individuals and groups.  However, it can also be an unintentional consequence of 
the actions and attitudes of service providers, as well as a product of broader policy and 
practice.’  Middle class residents tend to have greater access to the knowledge, skills, 
resources and networks needed to influence decisions (e.g. education, skills, networks 
and resources) and this often corresponds with the value sets of those in power.  Middle 
class residents are likely to be more motivated to oppose by virtue of their place 
dependence.  Hastings and Matthews (2011) conclude that ‘there is a clear need for 
middle class advantage to be afforded more prominence as a policy problem’ in areas 
such as local planning policy. 
 
However there has been limited systematic analysis of the dynamics of opposition 
movements and their impact.  Sturzaker (2010) documents the power of rural elites to 
influence planning policy in England.  While et al (2004) demonstrates how local planning 
authorities in Cambridgeshire were able to overcome the power of rural elites to prevent 
new housebuilding.   
 
Further work is required to understand why opposition is more or less effective in different 
local contexts.  There has been no detailed assessment of the impact of the NPPF on 
levels and impact of local opposition to new housebuilding. 
 
Research by Matthews et al (2014) suggests that home owners are more likely to oppose 
development than private renters.  However, this paper also suggests that whilst tenure 
divisions may conform to assumptions of economic rationality, opposition is also likely to 
be contingent upon intervening variables such as class, political support and age.  They 
also find that the movement toward a localist planning agenda is likely to bring together 
actors with higher levels of social capital to oppose development as a group rather than 
individually.  The term ‘homo democraticus’ is used to represent this oppositional group 
that may, as a result of the Big Society agenda, act in a less self-interestedly individualistic 
manner than they would otherwise.  
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Available literature and evidence may overestimate the scale and influence of local 
opposition to new house building in England because opposition makes for more 
interesting media articles and academic research.  This systemic view can also be seen in 
the extensive use of the term NIMBY, including misapplication to opposition groups who 
are concerned with wider aspects of the development such as societal conflict and political 
distrust (Burningham et al, 2006; Ellis, 2004). 
 
There is limited evidence of the role played by local councillors in opposition to new house 
building in the UK.   
 
Overcoming development resistance through plan-making 
Literature demonstrates how consensus building around plan-making and decision-making 
has helped to allay concerns about new development (Lake, 1993; Sturzaker, 2011).  In 
some cases this involves negotiation around the scale and ‘quality’ of development.  
Conversely, weak engagement, feelings of disempowerment and poor communication can 
intensify opposition (Inch, 2012).  While et al’s (2004) research in Cambridgeshire 
demonstrates how proactive plan-making can help build support for new house building. 
 
 
Evidence from the British Social Attitudes Survey 
 
British Social Attitudes (BSA) Surveys provide some evidence that public opposition to 
new housing development might be reducing, with more support for new housebuilding.  
The proportion of those who would support or strongly support new housebuilding in their 
local area increased from 28% (BSA 2010) to 47% (BSA 2013) (see Table 1).  The level of 
opposition to more new housebuilding in the local area fell from 47% (2010 BSA) to 31% 
(2013 BSA).  This continues a trend that can be traced back to 2005 (Bramley, undated).   
 
 
Table 1. BSA survey responses: attitude to more new housebuilding in the local area  
 
Support 
strongly 
Support 
Neither 
support 
nor 
oppose 
Oppos
e 
Oppose 
strongly 
It 
depend
s 
Don't 
know 
2
0
1
0
 
Respons
es 
5% 23% 23% 31% 16% 2% 1% 
Grouped 
response 
28% 23% 47% 
  
  
2
0
1
3
 
Respons
es 
10% 37% 20% 23% 7% 2% 0% 
Grouped 
response 
47% 20% 31% 
 
 
 
 
Source: compiled from British Social Attitudes survey’s 2010 & 2013 
 
 
Bramley (undated) noted the wide regional and tenure based variation in opposition to new 
housebuilding in the 2005 CityForm and 2010 British Social Attitude survey.  The 2013 
Survey marks a decrease in the regional variation of opposition and support once Inner 
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London has been removed.  Inner London respondents are more supportive of new 
housebuilding, with the proportion of support increasing from 50% (2010) to 73% (2013). 
The deviation in tenures remains between 2010 and 2013, but by 2013 there were more 
households supporting development in their area than opposing in all tenures. 
 
However the BSA revealed low levels of support for a financial payment policy.  In the 
2010 British Social Attitude Survey, only 1.7% of households who did not support new 
housebuilding felt that a financial incentive to existing residents would make them support 
more homes in the area. In 2013 this figure was 1.8%. 
 
There has been no detailed research on the extent to which the BSA responses are 
reflected in changing levels of opposition to and/or support for new housebuilding in actual 
planning applications or local plan preparation. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The main findings from the evidence review are: 
 
 The review confirmed that there is limited empirical or theoretical evidence that is 
directly relevant to financial payments aimed at reducing opposition to new 
development.   
 
 Theoretical work that has been undertaken suggests that direct financial payments are 
unlikely to influence the attitudes or behaviour of those opposed to new housebuilding 
and may lead to concerns about due process in determining planning applications.   
 
 Some of the concerns about new housing development that lead to opposition are 
unlikely to be assuaged by a financial payment.   
 
 There is limited systematic analysis and detailed understanding of the reasons why 
people oppose new housebuilding and what might be done to reduce that opposition.  
Academic and policy literature tends to focus on cases of conflict and opposition rather 
than agreement and consensus building. 
 
 Hypothetical studies of financial payment are strongly influenced by nuances in the 
language used and suggested levels of payment. 
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Annex B: The household respondents 
 
 
Table B1: Household respondents– age  
Age bracket Number 
20-35 7 
36-50 24 
51-65 43 
66+ 35 
Total 109 
 
Table B2: Number of interviews by income group by case study area 
 
E N IL SE LC SW Total % 
0-9k 
  
2 1 
  
3 4% 
10-19k 3 
 
2 5 
 
1 11 14% 
20-29k 4 
 
1 3 3 4 15 19% 
30-39k 3 3 2 
 
7 2 17 22% 
40-49k 6 
 
1 
 
1 5 13 16% 
50-59k 1 3 
  
2 
 
6 8% 
60-69k 
 
1 1 1 
 
1 4 5% 
80-89k 
 
2 
   
1 3 4% 
90-99k 
    
1 1 2 3% 
100k+ 
  
2 1 2 
 
5 6% 
Not revealed 6 6 6 5 3 4 30  
Total 23 15 17 16 19 19 109  
 
Table B3: Household respondents  – housing type 
Row Labels E N IL SE LC SW Total % 
Detached 10 11 
 
2 13 9 45 41% 
Flat 
  
14 1 
  
15 14% 
Semi 5 3 
 
5 5 4 22 20% 
Terrace 8 1 3 8 1 6 27 25% 
Total 23 15 17 16 19 19 109 
  
Table B4: Household respondents – tenure 
Row Labels Total % 
Housing association 3 3% 
Local authority 11 10% 
Owner occupier with mortgage 28 26% 
Owner occupier with other equity share 1 1% 
Owner occupier, owned outright 65 60% 
Private rental sector 1 1% 
Total 109 
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Annex C: Household interview topic guide 
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 46 
 
 
 
 47 
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Annex D: Profiles of willing to accept 
households 
 
 
 
 
Table D1: Respondents who said that a financial payment would reduce their opposition 
to new housing 
Area Age Tenure Household 
Income 
Opposition 
spectrum 
Amount 
unprompted 
Prompted 
on lower 
amount 
Comments 
IL 30s Social 
flat 
10-19K Weak £1000  Not strongly 
opposed 
IL 60s LA 
flat 
10-19K Medium £1000  To cover the 
inconvenience. 
SE 60s OO 
flat 
0-9K Weak £2000 No 
change 
Not strongly 
opposed 
E 20s LA 
terrace 
30-39K Weak £1000  “I’m not that 
opposed” 
N 70s OO 
detached 
60-69K Medium £5000+ No 
change 
Not strongly 
opposed 
SW 30s OO 
terrace 
30-39K, Strong D/K £5000+ Enough to pay 
for moving 
costs. 
SW 20s OO 
semi 
30-39K Strong D/K £5000 Development 
will go ahead 
anyway 
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Table D2: Respondents who said that a financial payment might reduce their opposition to 
new housing 
Area Age Tenure Household 
Income 
Opposition 
spectrum 
Amount 
unprompted 
Prompted 
on 
amount 
Comments 
SW 40s OO 
terrace 
30-39K Medium Don’t know £5,000 “compensate 
for all the 
inconvenience. 
It’s an inviting 
sum of 
money.” 
SW 30s OO 
detached 
40-49K Medium £10,000 No 
change 
Make a 
difference to 
mortgage 
LC 50s OO 
semi 
20-29K Weak Don’t know Over 
£1000 
Only if it was 
over and 
above the 
developer 
contribution. 
N 50s OO 
semi 
50-59K Strong Don’t know £10,000 “but that’s 
coming at it in 
the wrong way 
… to pay 
people is  
completely 
undemocratic” 
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